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Abstract:  The more important governmental cooperation and bureaucratic involvement 
become in ESDP, the more pressing becomes the issue of democratic control of executive 
cooperation. This article starts from the argument that parliamentary involvement in decision-
making is of central importance for ensuring the democratic quality of European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). It uses the notion of a multilevel parliamentary field to examine how 
parliaments at different levels are currently involved in ESDP. It turns out that during the past 
two decades or so no clear-cut privileged channel of parliamentary involvement has evolved 
in this field. Although national parliaments are of central importance due to the 
intergovernmental nature of decision-making, even they face severe problems in controlling 
executive decisions as their powers vary widely and both international cooperation among 
executive actors and military integration pose severe problems to control procedures at the 
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national level. The European Parliament and various forms of inter-parliamentary cooperation 
complement the work of member state parliaments. While they provide opportunities for 
public scrutiny of European security policies and for information sharing, working relations 
among parliaments in the field are not without frictions. The more executive decision-making 
departs from the purely intergovernmental model, the more problematic the existing 
arrangements for parliamentary involvement will become. There will be no easy remedy as 
adjustments in parliamentary control will require careful attention to the relations of the 
different elements in the parliamentary field. 
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1.  Introduction1 
By assuming responsibility for military missions in conflict zones from the Balkans to the 
Congo, the European Union’s (EU) impact on the lives of its citizens has acquired a new 
quality. Decisions on whether to put the lives of soldiers and civilians at risk are no longer 
made autonomously in national capitals but increasingly involve the Council, its Secretariat, 
the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, the Military Staff and the High 
Representative of the EU. This “Brusselisation” of decision-making on the use of armed force 
is not only an interesting object of study for anyone interested in the functioning of 
bureaucracies; it also raises important questions of democratic control. How can democratic 
legitimacy be guaranteed when the cooperation between executive actors becomes closer and 
closer? What is the role of parliaments in this respect? 
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To be sure, there is a venerable tradition in political theory that would argue that questions of 
democratic and parliamentary control do not apply to the realm of foreign and security policy 
and especially not to decisions with military implications. According to this position, different 
standards of democratic control pertain to domestic policies on the one hand and security 
policy on the other. As security policy is taken to require particularly rapid decision-making 
and, at times, a high degree of secrecy, it is regarded as the exclusive domain of the executive 
and thus lying outside the sphere of parliamentary control.2 Yet the most recent works 
conclude that “there is no principled reason why foreign and security policy as such should 
not be subjected to the same type of democratic scrutiny as other policy areas” (Stie, this 
issue; see also Lord 2008). This applies particularly to a non-state polity such as the EU 
whose legitimacy is much more fragile than that of nation states and therefore can be heavily 
damaged by policy failures in the foreign and security realm. An unsuccessful military 
mission, possibly involving the death of European soldiers, under the responsibility of the 
Union would doubtlessly provoke a contentious debate about the desirability of recent 
advances in European integration. If no proper democratic legitimation of the mission had 
been ensured, this could well shake the legitimacy of the entire integration project as such. 
Given this significance of the EU’s security policy for the democratic legitimacy of European 
integration at large, the lack of research into the democratic control of the EU’s security 
policy is lamentable.3 This article aims at redressing this deficit by analyzing one particular 
dimension of democratic legitimacy, namely parliamentary control, with a special focus on 
decisions on the use of force.  
 
In doing so, however, we face a peculiar conceptual problem. Parliamentary control of 
European policies in general and also of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is 
unique as there are different levels of parliamentary control that interact with each other. 
There is not merely one parliament faced with one executive; rather there are numerous 
parliamentary institutions at both the member state and the European levels. Moreover, there 
also exist transnational institutions, i.e. institutions linking member state parliaments with 
each other and member state parliaments with the European level. In order to derive an 
overall picture of parliamentary control we therefore need a conceptual tool that allows us to 
look both at the different levels of parliamentary involvement and at how they interact with 
each other. 
 
To this end we utilize the notion of the parliamentary field that has recently been developed 
by John Erik Fossum and Ben Crum (2008). According to this concept the relations between 
parliaments in the EU can be conceived as a field that is characterized by certain institutional 
features. As a yardstick against which to compare actual parliamentary fields, Fossum and 
Crum have developed three ideal-type fields4 which could provide a basis for legitimizing 
European policies, depending on the EU’s characteristics as a polity. These ideal-type fields 
correspond to conceptions of the EU as a functional regime, as a would-be federal state and as 
the regional component of a cosmopolitan order. Mapping the parliamentary field in ESDP 
and comparing its characteristics with these ideal-types will thus not only help us to develop a 
detailed overview of parliamentary control procedures. It will also provide us with a tool for 
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highlighting achievements and problems in the parliamentary control of European security 
policy.  
 
In what follows we will first briefly elaborate on the argument concerning why parliaments 
should be involved in security policy at all. Secondly, we will develop the notion of the 
parliamentary field as our conceptual lens, through which we will analyze parliamentary 
control of European security policy, and outline three ideal-types. Against this backdrop we 
can then map the actual parliamentary field by outlining arrangements at the national and 
supranational levels and institutions that cross these levels. In conclusion we will reflect on 
how the parliamentary field relates to the ideal-types and what this implies for the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU’s security policy. 
 
2.  Democracy, parliaments, and the EU’s security policy 
The democratic control of European security policy is located at the interface of two areas that 
both are highly problematic in terms of democratic legitimacy and democratic control: 
security policy and European integration. To begin with, security policy has long been viewed 
as an issue area to which standards of democratic participation and democratic control should 
not be applied in the same fashion as to domestic politics.5 In this view, effective foreign and 
security policies require a considerable degree of flexibility and secrecy. Since this does not 
square well with the transparency and deliberative character of democratic decision-making, 
foreign and security policies should be isolated from such processes.  
 
This view is highly questionable, however. Instead one may argue that security policy is a 
field in which democratic control is of particular importance. Especially in liberal 
democracies, democratic control of security policy in general and of the armed forces in 
particular can be regarded as a fundamental achievement of civilizing and democratizing the 
state. Because security policy is at the heart of the state and affects citizens much more 
fundamentally than other policies, e.g. by requiring them to risk their lives in war, the 
democratization of security might even be viewed as the culmination of democracy (with a 
view on Kant see e.g. Eberl and Fischer-Lescano 2005). It is certainly the single most 
important area in terms of the democratic ideal that those affected by a decision must have an 
equal chance to influence it, as citizens would here potentially decide on their own physical 
survival.  
 
Democratic control here implies control through parliaments as representative institutions. To 
be sure, parliaments are not the only channel through which democratic control may be 
exercised. The general public and civil society have their roles as well, e.g. through 
scandalizing decisions and demanding policy changes as could be seen in the widespread 
protests surrounding the 2003 intervention in Iraq by a US-led coalition. Courts as well may 
contribute to democratic control by examining the legality of decisions. However, neither the 
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general public nor courts can substitute for parliamentary control as neither of them is entitled 
to make binding political decisions. Moreover, as Christopher Lord (2008) has pointed out, it 
is only parliaments that, as representative institutions, are able to guarantee the principle of 
political equality in making or scrutinizing political decisions. And, finally, since parliaments 
cover all areas of political decisions in their work they are better equipped than issue-specific 
institutions to review functionally specific security cooperation in the context of all other 
policies. 
 
These arguments for the importance of parliamentary control hold not only for the security 
policy of states but also for the EU. The fact that the EU pursued the declared goal of 
promoting democracy through its external relations further adds to this as it raises 
expectations as to the standard of democratic control of its own policies, including its external 
relations (Bátora, this issue). But organizing democratic control of security policy within the 
EU is far from easy and this touches on the second issue which makes democratic control of 
European security policy problematic. International cooperation and European integration 
pose particular obstacles to democratic and parliamentary control. These obstacles occur even 
though international cooperation may be considered a crucial prerequisite for maintaining 
democratic standards in an era of denationalization. The democratic principle – those who 
will be affected by a political decision should have an equal opportunity to take part in the 
making of that decision – presupposes that the political space (in which the decisions are 
made) and the social space (to which these decisions apply) are congruent (Scharpf 1993; 
Wolf 2000). Under conditions of globalization or denationalization (Zürn 2000) political and 
social interdependence have vastly increased among nation states and their respective 
societies. From this there resulted a growing incongruence between political and social 
spaces. With the increase in cross-border transactions, regulatory problems as well as their 
solutions have increasingly become transnationalized while political authority remained 
confined to nation states. International institutions thus help to re-establish congruence by 
tackling social problems on those levels where they emerge.  
 
However, this generates the need to extend democratic control to the international level now. 
The more the reach of international institutions crosses national borders, i.e. the more they 
affect ordinary citizens’ life, the more virulent questions of legitimacy become. Tackling them 
purely on the basis of national control procedures will not suffice. This holds even when 
national governments retain their veto rights at the international level and are domestically 
accountable to parliament. To be sure, one may argue that in this case, international 
agreements would remain connected to national representative democratic institutions, and 
hence the congruence principle would be safeguarded. But there are good reasons to argue 
that this solution does not work well, as it has several important prerequisites which are not 
met in practice. International procedures and decision-making processes would have to be 
sufficiently public and transparent so that both national parliaments and publics at large could 
receive information about the alternatives of policy-making. Moreover governance 
institutions would need to offer the opportunity for all those affected by a decision to 
participate in decision-making and, finally, these institutions would need to establish 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-012a.htm   5 
 
EIoP                                              © 2010 by Dirk Peters, Wolfgang Wagner and Nicole Deitelhoff 
accountability to ensure that constituencies can attribute responsibility. As has been 
frequently noted, actual international governance arrangements violate almost all of these 
criteria. Decisions are usually made behind closed doors, within exclusive settings which are 
hardly accessible to publics at large. To make things worse, national governments appear to 
forge international governance institutions precisely because they attempt to insulate 
themselves from their national legislatives and from societal demands. They exploit the 
tendency of intergovernmental governance to shift the power balance between executives and 
legislatives towards the former (Moravcsik 1994; Wolf 1999). Moreover, topics of 
international cooperation and European integration are mostly irrelevant to national elections, 
which further weakens the link between national parliaments and the democratic control of 
international or European cooperation. 
 
Therefore, even when the desirability of parliamentary control of security policy is accepted, 
it may prove highly difficult to institutionalize it in a European setting. Even in a purely 
intergovernmental setting mere reliance on national control procedures will not suffice. 
Fortunately, within the EU parliamentary institutions do not only exist at the national level. 
Instead there is a complex multilevel parliamentary field in which parliaments on the national 
and supranational levels take over different responsibilities and interact in various ways. The 
solution for the problem of democratic and parliamentary control, then, may be found within 
this parliamentary field. 
 
In the remainder of this paper we will map this parliamentary field and assess its contribution 
to the democratic control of European security policy. In what follows, we will equip 
ourselves with a more elaborate conception of the multilevel parliamentary field and then 
utilize it to sketch and discuss the main aspects of this field in European security policy. 
 
3.  Multilevel parliamentary fields 
John Erik Fossum and Ben Crum (2008) have developed the notion of the parliamentary field 
to capture the interplay of parliamentary institutions on and across different levels in the EU. 
Their concept is based on Paul Di Maggio and Walter Powell’s notion of an “organizational 
field” which denotes “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area 
of institutional life” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 148), displaying both connectedness and 
structural equivalence (ibid.; Fossum and Crum 2008, 8). A “multilevel parliamentary 
organizational field” thus denotes a field in which parliaments are in some way 
interconnected in a specific area on and across different levels of political organization. The 
advantage of this notion is that it does not focus exclusively on separate channels of 
parliamentary control but directs research towards the totality of relevant parliamentary actors 
and also includes their interaction across different levels. 
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A multilevel parliamentary field can be institutionalized in a variety of ways. For the EU, 
Fossum and Crum (2008, 12-23) distinguish three ideal-type institutional layouts each of 
which is connected to a particular conception of the EU as a polity. Accordingly, the EU can 
be conceived either as a functional regime, as federal state in the making or as the regional 
component of a cosmopolitan order. Within a functional regime, the ideal-type parliamentary 
field would have its prime locus at the level of national parliaments whereas the European 
level would serve to complement national arrangements and fulfil what they term a 
‘deliberative audit function’. In this view the EU is simply a collaborative arrangement that 
has been created by member states to help them solve collective action problems. Member 
states delegate competences to the European level, but decision-making remains in their 
hands (intergovernmentalism) and consequently democratic legitimacy remains derived from 
legitimizing mechanisms at the national level. The problems of achieving democratic 
legitimacy in intergovernmental settings through national parliaments, which we noted above, 
are tackled through complementary arrangements at the European level. The European 
Parliament (EP), in this view, would not play a representative role in its own right because the 
sovereign remains located at the member state level. Rather the EP would “through standing 
committees and special enquiries, through debates and hearings, and so forth shed light on the 
nooks and crannies of the EU system, and as such also aid the national parliaments in their 
efforts to hold their executives accountable when they operate at the EU level” (Fossum and 
Crum 2008, 13). Thus the EP would further enable national parliaments to hold executives to 
account. 
 
If instead the EU is conceived as a federal state in the making, the ideal-type parliamentary 
field would be organized in functionally specific domains. Both member state parliaments and 
the EP would serve the same functions (deliberation and decision-making), yet in different 
policy areas. Where policies are made primarily through intergovernmental decision-making, 
as is by and large the case in the EU’s security policy, the structure would resemble that of the 
functional regime type just described with national parliaments playing the dominant role. In 
areas, however, where there is supranational European policy-making, parliamentary control 
would have to involve a strong EP. 
 
Both ideal-types discussed so far are intimately related to the idea of the nation-state. 
Parliamentary control is perceived primarily in terms of state boundaries with parliamentary 
power concentrated where executive state power is concentrated too, either at the level of 
member states or at the level of a federal European state. Legitimacy is arrived at by holding 
executives to account and by enabling those who are affected by a decision to participate or 
be represented in decision-making. Lately a third position in the debate about democratic 
legitimacy has received increasing attention which argues that conceptions of legitimacy 
beyond the nation-state would be more attuned to the character of the EU. These conceptions 
come in various shapes. Some scholars develop post-democratic legitimation strategies 
(implicitly Beck and Grande 2004; Moravcsik 2004; Neyer 2010) that deny forms of 
democratic legitimacy for the EU and instead refer to concepts such as Justice (Neyer 2010). 
The majority retains the idea of democratic legitimation but argues for a mixture of different 
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sources of legitimation for the EU pointing to the EU’s multilevel character and to the idea 
that the EU may be conceived as a regional component of a wider cosmopolitan order. While 
we cannot discuss all different approaches that follow such a strategy here, we briefly 
describe one prominent feature that many of them share, i.e. the idea of deliberative 
democracy (see Schmalz-Bruns 2001; see also the contribution by Anne Elizabeth Stie to this 
special issue).  
 
Arguments about deliberative democracy have mushroomed in International Relations 
research during the last years.6 Deliberative democracy is seen as a particularly promising 
concept for democratizing the EU as it does not presuppose substantial social prerequisites 
like rich collective identities but rather holds the promise of producing those elements of 
community it relies on. 
 
Deliberative democracy is an attempt to integrate input and output legitimacy into one model 
by aligning participation in decision-making with rationalization of decisions to ensure 
individual autonomy (Cohen and Sabel 1997; Habermas 1996 and 2007; Niesen 2008). 
Legitimate decisions are seen as a result of public discourses in which those affected by the 
decision aim at arriving at a reasoned, i.e. rational consensus. While this presupposes that 
actors share some normative background, it does not require that they feel bound by a 
community in a strong sense. However, a closer look at empirical studies of deliberative 
procedures reveals that deliberation often does not go easily together with democratic 
procedures (for an excellent overview Niesen 2008).7 Strategies to solve the problem of 
insufficient participation or representation in deliberative processes are in abundant supply 
and most of them highlight either the inclusion of civil society actors or, more broadly, the 
situating of deliberative fora within some forms of transnational publics (e.g. Bohman 2005). 
However, this is not sufficient to help democratize politics. Many studies have demonstrated 
that civil society organizations can neither represent a global demos (Nanz and Steffek 2005) 
nor are themselves democratically legitimized by anyone (Schmidt and Take 1997; Wolf 
2000). Rather, to be democratic, deliberative procedures need to combine weak (civil 
society/general public) and strong publics (e.g. parliaments) (Fraser 1992; Brunkhorst 2002; 
Deitelhoff 2009). They depend on public law and representative institutions to ensure equal 
access to deliberative procedures and influence in such procedures (Habermas 2005, 385).  
 
Parliaments thus play a crucial role in conceptions of deliberative democracy. A 
parliamentary field reflecting the idea of deliberative democracy beyond the nation state 
would require interaction among parliaments across different levels. In contrast to the 
preceding models, any parliament would “no longer be the main institutional manifestation of 
a given, sovereign, democratic demos, but [...] rather one among a chain of strong publics 
who together seek to accommodate the interests and concerns of a multitude of 
interdependent demoi” (Fossum and Crum 2008, 21, emphases in original). Relations on the 
different levels and across these levels would thus be institutionalized, in contrast to the 
preceding models where the different levels possess more or less clearly delineated spheres of 
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competence. The EU would then be neither a functional regime nor a federal state in the 
making. Rather it could be perceived as part of a larger deliberative cosmopolitan order.  
 
4.  The parliamentary field of European security policy 
Based on the preceding reflection we can now examine the parliamentary field which we 
encounter in the sphere of European security policy. We look first at the member state and 
supranational level in turn and then at transnational arrangements and discuss how 
parliamentary involvement is organized at each level and how the arrangements relate to the 
ideal-types presented above. 
4.1  The national level: member state parliaments and European security policy 
Probably the most characteristic feature of parliamentary involvement at the member state 
level is that there is no standard way in which member state parliaments are engaged in 
European security affairs and no guarantee that national parliaments are involved at all. As 
Suzana Anghel, Hans Born, Alex Dowling and Teodora Fuior (2008) have demonstrated, 
there exist a wide variety of arrangements for the national control of European security policy, 
ranging from co-decision powers over troop deployments to a complete lack of parliamentary 
involvement (see also Born and Urscheler 2004; Wagner 2006; Dieterich et al. 2008). 
 
If we take national parliaments’ participation in decisions about the national military 
contributions to ESDP missions as an indicator, we can distinguish at least four typical 
practices which represent the wide spectrum of member state arrangements for parliamentary 
involvement. At one end of the spectrum there are states in which parliament appears to play 
no role whatsoever in the policy-making process on ESDP missions (Bulgaria, Greece and 
Romania). A somewhat more prominent role is granted to parliaments which debate potential 
or actual ESDP missions, even though government is not formally bound by parliamentary 
decisions (Belgium, France, Poland, Portugal and the UK). Then there are states in which 
parliament can make binding decisions on national contributions to ESDP missions, namely 
Austria, Germany, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain. 
Here parliament cannot only debate ESDP missions and national contributions but actually 
veto the deployment of national troops. The end of the spectrum is marked by three member 
states (Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden), in which parliaments are involved at an even 
earlier stage of decision-making. Parliaments in these countries can commit their government 
to a particular position already during the negotiations on a potential ESDP mission in the 
Council, i.e. before an ESDP mission is put in place at the European level. Overall only in 
some member states parliaments can function as a direct check on national executive power.  
 
But even where there is a parliamentary veto power over certain decisions as national troop 
deployments this does not ensure effective control. Rather, the effectiveness of the national 
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channel of parliamentary control is hampered by several factors. It suffers in particular from 
the tendency of international cooperation to tilt the balance between executive and parliament 
towards the former (Moravcsik 1994; Wolf 1999). Once an international agreement has been 
reached it “may be costly, sometimes prohibitively so, for national parliaments, publics or 
officials to reject, amend or block ratification of and compliance with decisions reached by 
national executives in international fora” (Moravcsik 1994, 11). This weakens the position 
even of those parliaments that possess a veto power over troop deployments because a 
negative parliamentary vote after government has, in principle, signalled agreement at the 
international level would entail high reputational costs for the state and weaken its position in 
future negotiations.  
 
In the military realm, this general effect is further exacerbated in several ways. First, EU 
military deployments are almost always part of arrangements in which other actors besides 
the EU and its member states play a crucial role. Even foreign ministers in the EU Council 
can no longer amend agreements previously reached between the conflicting parties or within 
the UN Security Council which form the basis of an ESDP mission. Second, integrated 
military units have become a crucial feature of European security policy. Even though 
decisions about the deployment of these units are still made on an intergovernmental basis, 
military integration raises the costs for both national governments and national parliaments to 
refrain from participation in an operation on which other members largely agree. States may 
still decide not to participate or they may qualify their contribution in order to bring it in line 
with domestic preferences. But these options can be used only in a very restricted way due to 
the integrated nature of the units to be deployed. The EU’s battlegroup concept (Lindstrom 
2007), for example, implies that in the event of a decision to launch a military mission, the 
battlegroup currently on stand-by has to be sent abroad lest the EU refrains from intervening 
at all. If forces have been integrated, any state’s decision against its participation in a mission 
de facto frustrates the entire deployment because other states’ forces cannot work effectively 
without the missing state’s contribution. As a consequence, states whose forces have been 
integrated on an international level may come under heavy peer pressure from those states 
that advocate the use of joint forces. The same effect results from any elaborate scheme of 
role specialization. If capabilities are no longer held by all member states but by only a few or 
even a single one, the menu of choice for the member state concerned has been severely 
transformed. Instead of deciding about its country’s participation in a particular military 
mission, it de facto bears the burden of deciding about whether the EU will become involved 
at all, because no other member state could replace the capability under consideration.  
 
Other factors that complicate purely national parliamentary control of European security 
policies can be added. National parliaments seldom have direct access to information on 
European operations from the European level. National governments may act as gate-keepers, 
which in turn makes effective control of European decisions through national parliaments 
more difficult. Moreover national parliaments do not receive information on the role that their 
governments played in the making of European decisions, which impinges on their ability to 
hold governments accountable (Gourlay 2004, 185 and 194). Finally, other actors, beside 
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member state governments in the Council, increasingly gain influence on ESDP decision-
making and on the implementation of these decisions. The process of “Brusselisation” already 
mentioned has the potential to constrain the control of member state governments especially 
in the early stages of the decision-making process. The Council Secretariat, for instance, 
which is neither directly nor indirectly responsible to national parliaments, assumes an 
increasingly important role in preparing ESDP decisions and missions (see the contribution by 
Juncos and Pomorsca to this issue). Moreover, the still modest but growing cross-pillarisation 
in foreign and security policy (Stetter 2004) also poses a problem for national control of 
European security policies because it gives increasing weight to other European actors, who 
are not accountable to national parliaments. The increasing importance which is attached to 
the coherence of the EU’s external policies has, for instance, given the Commission growing 
influence. It has been able to capitalize on the nexus between security and development, 
framed security as a first pillar issue and hence gained increasing leverage over the EU’s 
peace-building efforts in Africa (Sicurelli 2008). Moreover, each time the Council delegates 
the implementation of its decisions to the European Commission (e.g. in the case of sanctions) 
or the European Defense Agency (in case of armament programs), the chain of accountability 
is further prolonged and thereby removed from national parliaments. 
 
Taken together, then, there is no uniform involvement of member state parliaments in 
European security policy. Some parliaments do not even debate central aspects of European 
security policy. Moreover, the effectiveness of co-decision powers, which some member state 
parliaments do possess, is limited due to some features of international security cooperation 
which pose serious obstacles to effective national parliamentary control. 
4.2  The supranational level: European Parliament 
How is this rather varied national foundation of the parliamentary field complemented at the 
level of supranational parliamentarism? Although no longer the sole directly elected 
parliament beyond the nation state,8 the European Parliament remains the prime embodiment 
of supranational parliamentarianism.9 Especially since its first direct elections in 1979, it has 
been remarkably successful in extending its competences (Rittberger 2005). However, the 
realm of foreign, security and defence policy has remained exempt from this general 
tendency.10  
 
This holds even though the EP’s committee system reflects a remarkable appreciation of 
foreign policy issues. MEPs have viewed the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET, after the 
French acronym ‘affaires étrangères’) as a high-status committee that consequently attracted 
rather ambitious and well-known politicians (Judge/Earnshaw 2008: 171). With currently 76 
members it has been the largest of the EP’s committees. Moreover, it is the only committee 
which has established two sub-committees (on human rights and on security and defense) to 
cope with a comprehensive agenda, ranging from enlargement to military missions. 
Notwithstanding such investments into the EP’s capabilities to play a prominent role in 
foreign, security and defence policy, Esther Barbé and Anna Herranz Surrallés (2008) 
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demonstrate how MEPs consistently attempted to extend their power over issues of European 
security policy and how their success has remained fairly limited. The EP is, by and large, 
confined to a deliberating role. Member states have taken care to restrict the EP’s budgetary 
influence on CFSP expenditure and even its consultative powers have remained below the 
level desired by MEPs. 
 
The EP’s most important rights on foreign and security policy under the TEU today certainly 
concern information and consultation. According to article 36 TEU11, the High 
Representative  
 
“shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common 
foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy and inform it on how those policies 
evolve. He or she shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration.”  
 
Even though ESDP had not been mentioned explicitly before the Treaty of Lisbon entered 
into effect, it had already been included in consultations before (Gourlay 2004, 188 f.). 
However, the EP never was entirely satisfied with the implementation of this provision. On 
the one hand, it appreciates the regular visits of key decision-makers in its Foreign Affairs 
Committee.12 On the other hand, the EP claims that  
 
“the Council’s practice of merely informing Parliament and submitting a descriptive list of CFSP activities 
carried out in the previous year, instead of really consulting Parliament at the beginning of each year on the 
main aspects and basic choices to be made for that year and subsequently reporting to Parliament whether – 
and, if so, how – Parliament’s contribution has been taken into account, constitutes a de facto infringement 
of the very substance of Article 21”.13 
 
In a similar vein, the EP has struggled to get hold of classified foreign and security policy 
documents. In 2002, Council and Parliament reached an Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) 
according to which the Parliament’s President, the Foreign Affairs Committee’s chair and 
four further deputies may inspect classified documents. However, the Council has reserved 
itself a right to deny access if it deems this appropriate. 
 
The EP’s budgetary powers are equally limited. Most importantly, Parliament has no 
influence whatsoever over expenditure arising from military operations. These are not 
charged to the Community budget but are covered by member states following a “costs lie 
where they fall”-principle (“Athena-mechanism”). From Parliament’s perspective, military 
expenditure appears as a shadow budget which increases the Council’s discretion in financial 
matters (Brok and Gresch 2004, 220). But even for other CFSP expenditures the EP’s powers 
are heavily constrained. Initially, member states set up a special regime to exempt CFSP 
expenditure from the Community budget. An IIA reached in 1999 and updated in 200614 
brought the financing of CFSP closer to the Community budget. According to this IIA, 
Council, Commission and Parliament have to reach agreement on both the overall amount of 
the operating expenditure and on its distribution between various articles of the CFSP budget 
chapter such as “non-proliferation and disarmament”, “emergency measures” or “European 
Union Special Representatives” (Diedrichs 2004; Kietz et al. 2005). If the CFSP budget turns 
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out to be insufficient, no additional funds can be appropriated without Parliament’s consent. 
However, to ensure flexibility, the Commission may transfer appropriations autonomously 
between articles within the CFSP budget chapter. As a consequence, Parliament is sidelined 
on approving budgets for individual common actions (Schmalz 1998, 36). Moreover, in case 
no consensus on additional Community funds can be reached, the Council may unanimously 
opt for financing certain actions outside the Community budget.  
 
Overall, then, the supranational level in the parliamentary field has mainly the role of 
generating information and debating European security policy. Its direct involvement in the 
European decision-making process is highly restricted – even in the budgetary realm. 
4.3  Crossing the levels: inter-parliamentary cooperation 
Between the national and the supranational levels an additional parliamentary layer has 
developed in European security affairs, the level of inter-parliamentary cooperation. This 
cooperation takes a variety of forms. There are on the one hand some fora which have no firm 
organizational framework and bring together members of national parliaments and of the 
European Parliament. Member state parliaments’ committees of foreign and defence affairs, 
for example, are invited twice a year by the EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss 
foreign and security affairs. Moreover, there is a Conference of Defence Committee Chairs, in 
which the EP is also represented.15 Secondly, inter-parliamentary cooperation also takes place 
in more formally organized and publicly visible fora, i.e. in transnational parliamentary 
assemblies. Transnational assemblies are “transnational, multilateral actors which are 
constituted by groups of members of national parliaments” (Marschall 2005, 22, our 
translation). Such transnational parliamentary assemblies may offer a unique contribution to 
the democratic control of international arrangements because they are not modelled after the 
national standard of parliamentary control. In contrast to supranational parliaments they do 
not come in the guise of future parliaments of future federal states. Rather they constitute 
attempts to respond to the international cooperation among executives through transnational 
cooperation among parliaments. 
 
In the area of European security policy there exist two such assemblies: the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA), which is composed of MPs from NATO’s 28 member 
states and at whose meetings the EP also is represented; and the Assembly of Western 
European Union (WEU Assembly), to which not only WEU full members but overall 39 
European countries can send delegations.16 Of these two, the WEU Assembly is certainly 
more directly concerned with issues of EU security policy. Like WEU, the WEU Assembly is 
about to be dissolved as a consequence of the emergence of ESDP. When ESDP was created, 
all elements of WEU which could be employed in international crisis management were 
transferred to the EU. However, the WEU was not dissolved immediately because the EU 
member states could not agree on transferring the WEU Treaty’s collective defence clause to 
the EU Treaty as well. Consequently, the WEU Assembly continued its work as well. Since 
almost all operational tasks of WEU had been moved to the EU, the WEU Assembly sought 
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to extend its sphere of competence to the EU’s ESDP. To signify this adaptation, the 
Assembly added the designation “Interparliamentary European Security and Defence 
Assembly” to its name. However, the European Parliament has opposed proposals put 
forward by the WEU Assembly to assume a formal role in ESDP.17 As a consequence, the 
WEU Assembly’s efforts have remained unsuccessful; it is now scheduled to dissolve by 
2011. 
 
Art. IX of the Modified Brussels Treaty requires the WEU Council of Ministers to submit “an 
annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments” to the 
Assembly. Today, these reports deal in detail with the past year’s developments in ESDP. The 
Assembly can reject such a report by an absolute majority of its members.18 Such a rejection 
is the most powerful tool at the hands of the Assembly. Even though it has no legal 
consequences, the Council considers the public signal which would be sent out by such a 
rejection as highly undesirable, which gives the Assembly some leverage. Beyond debating 
and responding to the annual report, the Assembly is mainly concerned with drawing up 
reports on all aspects of European Security. 
 
Transnational assemblies have several weaknesses, especially when compared to their 
supranational counterparts. First, their members “consider themselves primarily as 
representatives of home parliaments” and therefore view international politics “through the 
prism of national priorities, or those of their constituencies” (Šabič 2008, 266). Second, and 
related to this first weakness, there is a high turnover of their members because the 
composition of the assembly usually changes after each national election, when the newly 
elected national parliament sends a new delegation. Whereas both the European Parliament 
and national parliaments retain (by and large) the same composition over a complete 
legislative period, the composition of transnational assemblies is subject to almost continuous 
change. In the case of WEU, this problem is further exacerbated by the fact that national 
parliaments tend not to send their foreign and security experts to the assembly. Only half of 
the members of the German delegation, for instance, are members of either the foreign or 
defence or EU committee of the German parliament. Regular members of the Bundestag’s 
committees of foreign and defence policy constitute only a third of the German delegation. 
This is due to a stipulation in the Modified Brussels Treaty which states that the national 
delegations to the WEU Assembly are identical with those for the parliamentary assembly of 
the Council of Europe. 
 
Another practical problem that has hampered the work of the WEU Assembly in recent years 
lies in its relations with the EP. Since the Assembly has attempted to claim responsibility for 
the parliamentary control of the newly created ESDP it is regarded as a competitor by the 
European Parliament. This makes cooperation between the two assemblies extremely 
difficult, whereas cooperation between the EP and the NATO PA apparently works much 
more smoothly as becomes visible e.g. in the much stronger attendance of MEPs at the 
sessions of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 
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These practical problems contribute to the rather unenthusiastic assessments which the WEU 
Assembly’s work usually receives. Such assessments, however, often apply a problematic 
standard. They focus on how the Assembly as a collective actor can influence other collective 
actors, in particular the Council of Ministers. These assessments result, for instance, in calls 
for stronger competences of the Assembly vis-à-vis the intergovernmental institutions (e.g. 
Habegger 2005, 230). The negative evaluations of their own work, which are reported from 
many members of the WEU Assembly (Jun/Kuper 1997: 153), indicate that members of the 
Assembly themselves tend to rely on this conception.  
 
Yet there are also other ways of approaching the work of transnational parliamentary 
assemblies. Applying Anne Marie Slaughter’s perspective (Slaughter 2004) such assemblies 
are not primarily collective actors but rather networks of actors and thus responses to the 
emergence of international executive networks. This would imply a different standard for 
assessing the contribution of these assemblies to reducing the democratic deficit. They cannot 
only contribute to parliamentary control by acting as collective opponents of the Council; but 
also by offering resources to their members which improve their capability to restore national 
control over executive decisions. National parliamentarians can, through their participation in 
interparliamentary fora, receive information that they may otherwise not be able to attain from 
their governments. Moreover, the assemblies can function as fora in which national MPs can 
exchange their views not only on European security issues but also on problems of national 
control. This will help to raise awareness not only of European security policy issues in 
parliaments across Europe; but also of specific problems of national parliamentary control 
procedures and may thus also contribute to improving control capabilities at the national 
level. These effects of interparliamentary cooperation will go unnoticed, however, if the value 
of interparliamentary assemblies is judged solely on the basis of their direct competences vis-
à-vis the Council. 
 
Yet another potential benefit of the current forms of interparliamentary cooperation lies in the 
links it creates to states outside the EU. ESDP missions, for instance, are open for 
participation from non-EU members, but the inclusion of these countries in the political 
process operates only at the executive level, e.g. through the inclusion of government 
delegates in the Committee of Contributors for an ESDP mission. Affiliation to the WEU 
Assembly can provide a way for parliamentarians from non-EU members to become involved 
in debating and scrutinizing the relevant decisions at the European level. It is therefore 
important to look at the interplay of the different levels of parliamentary control of European 
security policy – which leads us back to the concept of the parliamentary field. 
 
5.  The parliamentary field in European security policy: an overall assessment 
If we look at the different aspects of the parliamentary field combined, we see that it does not 
conform completely to any of the ideal-type models that can be derived from assumptions 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-012a.htm   15 
 
EIoP                                              © 2010 by Dirk Peters, Wolfgang Wagner and Nicole Deitelhoff 
about the character of the EU. This is hardly surprising since the EU’s overall polity character 
in the security realm is not very clear-cut either (e.g. Sjursen 2007 as well as the contribution 
by Mérand/Hofmann/Trondelle to this issue). What is important to note, however, is that the 
institutional structures of accountability as we can currently see them in the parliamentary 
field appear to be somewhat out of sync with the developments in the executive realm.  
 
The parliamentary field in the security realm does, on the one hand, not conform with what 
we would expect for a purely intergovernmental policy area. To be sure, some national 
parliaments possess well-developed tools to hold their national executives to account over 
European policy or at least to prevent them from deploying troops for ESDP operations. 
However the foundation for democratic accountability over European security policy is 
incomplete at best as far as the national level is concerned. There are parliaments which 
simply do not possess the necessary competences to control their national executives. And 
some of those possessing the necessary competences do not make regular use of them. 
Moreover the peculiar character of international security cooperation makes it difficult for 
national parliaments to exert control in any case.  
 
The national basis for parliamentary control of European security policy therefore needs to be 
supplemented. It is complemented by both a supranational parliamentary level and by 
collaboration among national parliaments and between national parliaments and the EP. The 
European Parliament has some powers to create publicity over security-related decisions at 
the European level. Its function in the security realm matches quite well what Fossum and 
Crum (2008, 13) termed the deliberative audit function of the supranational level. It can 
inquire into European security policies and shed light on the details of European policy-
making. The information generated by the EP could in principle increase the ability of 
national parliaments to hold their governments accountable. However, since national 
parliaments are so unevenly involved in European security affairs this will be at best partially 
successful, namely for those countries in which national parliaments possess sufficient control 
rights and actually make use of them. 
 
Even if security cooperation in the EU could be considered merely a functional regime, the 
institutionalization of parliamentary control would thus have to be considered defective. 
However the EU’s security policy has developed beyond the confines of a regime and is no 
longer a purely intergovernmental enterprise. Although decisions continue to be made by 
unanimity in the Council, the creation of permanent Brussels-based decision-making bodies, 
the rising importance of administrative actors and a moderate process of cross-pillarisation 
have reduced direct member-state influence. The mere reliance on national channels of 
democratic accountability would thus be insufficient anyhow (Sjursen 2007, 6-8). The 
parliamentary field, however, has not adjusted to the increasing significance of executive 
actors beyond member state governments in European security policy. The EP remains 
basically confined to its deliberative audit function. In contrast to the federal model of the 
parliamentary field, then, the distribution of executive competences between the European 
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and the member state level does not directly correspond with the allocation of parliamentary 
competences.  
 
The fact that the parliamentary field is difficult to capture in terms of both ideal-types that are 
based on nation-state models (audit democracy, federal democracy) suggests that the concept 
of the nation-state may not be the best way to capture the character of parliamentary control 
of the EU’s security policy. What supports this conjecture are the various institutions of 
interparliamentary cooperation which have developed in the security field. They distinguish 
this parliamentary cooperation from what we would encounter within nation-states and, 
moreover, conform well with the deliberative model of the parliamentary field. However, in 
its current state of institutionalization this is a cooperation that has both great potential and 
clear limitations. The potential lies in particular in the additional information that can be 
generated through interparliamentary cooperation. National MPs can gain information about 
both processes at the EU level and processes in other European states. These may be difficult 
to obtain otherwise and will improve the capacity of national parliamentarians for controlling 
their executives at home. Furthermore, inter-parliamentary cooperation in the WEU Assembly 
extends to non-EU members which may participate in ESDP operations but are not 
represented in the EP.  
 
However there are also some obvious limitations which result from the form in which 
interparliamentary cooperation is currently organized. It appears, for instance, that active 
participation in assembly sessions is not always a top priority of parliamentarians who tend to 
be overburdened already with their duties in their home parliaments. This problem is further 
aggravated by the dysfunctional selection rule for the members of the WEU Assembly who 
are at the same time members of their national delegation to the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly. Last but not least the turf battles that have developed between the 
EP and the WEU Assembly have prevented fruitful cooperation on this level. This weakens 
the link between parliamentarians from member state parliaments and the EP, a link that is 
rather fragile in organizational terms anyhow. 
 
Taken together, then, we see that there is no perfect match between the character of policy-
making in the realm of European security policy and the parliamentary field. Policy-making 
has a strong intergovernmental basis, but intergovernmentalism is increasingly weakened, not 
least because of the processes analyzed in this special issue. Governments in the Council 
remain the final decision-makers, which would provide the basis for effective democratic 
control via national parliaments. But there are dynamics in the ESDP decision-making 
process that escape national democratic control procedures. This concerns not only the 
bargaining dynamics in the Council but also the influence of bureaucratic actors on ESDP 
decisions and implementation (see the contributions in Part I and II of this special issue). The 
parliamentary field matches this mixed character of policy-making only partially. For a purely 
intergovernmental realm, the EP’s deliberative audit function would seem fit. But even then, 
the field would lack the corresponding basis in strong member states parliaments due to the 
highly varied character of parliamentary involvement at the member state level. Inter-
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parliamentary cooperation could provide an important complement in such a situation, 
especially when the drift away from purely intergovernmental decision-making is taken into 
account. It is crucially weakened, however, by the practical problems of inter-parliamentary 
dialogue and the weak overall involvement of parliaments in the European decision-making 
process. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The map of the parliamentary field in European security policy demonstrates the complexities 
of establishing democratic and parliamentary control in a dynamic multilevel polity and 
moreover in a policy field for which parliamentary involvement has not always been regarded 
as desirable. What has developed during the past two decades or so is a field in which there is 
no clear-cut privileged channel of parliamentary involvement. National parliaments certainly 
are central as they are the only organizations in the field with decision-making power and 
with direct access to the national executives. Yet national parliaments’ actual powers vary 
widely, and even strong member state parliaments will face control problems stemming from 
the role of bureaucratic actors and the general dynamics of international cooperation and 
military integration. The European Parliament and various forms of interparliamentary 
cooperation complement the work of member state parliaments. They provide opportunities 
for public scrutiny of European security policies, information-sharing and public debate. 
Working relations in the field, however, are not without frictions and the more executive 
decision-making departs from the purely intergovernmental model, the more problematic the 
existing arrangements for parliamentary involvement will become. 
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Endnotes 
1 This paper emanates from RECON (Reconstituting Democracy in Europe), an Integrated Project 
supported by the European Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme (contract no. CIT4-CT-2006-
028698). The paper is based on the introductory chapter to Peters, D./Wagner, W./Deitelhoff, N. (eds.) 
The Parliamentary Control of European Security Policy, Oslo: ARENA (RECON Report No. 6), 29-
49. We would like to thank Thomas Conzelmann, Ben Crum, Marianne Riddervold and Anne-
Elisabeth Stie for helpful comments and suggestions. 
2 Classics of this tradition include John Locke (1960 [1690], particularly §§ 145-148 of the Second 
Treatise) and Alexis de Tocqueville (1990 [1835/40], 234 f.). 
3 Important exceptions include Kantner and Liberatore (2006); Bono (2004); Hilger (2002); Hummel 
(2003); Koenig-Archibugi (2002). 
4 It should be noted that in a subsequent version of this paper, Fossum and Crum (2009) no longer 
develop three ideal types of the parliamentary field but reserve the term for inter-parliamentary 
cooperation on and across multiple levels of the European polity.  
5 See fn. 2. 
6 Arguments about deliberative democracy dealt with arguing and persuasion in diplomatic 
negotiations (Müller 2004; Deitelhoff and Müller 2005; Ulbert and Risse 2005), with CFSP (Sjursen 
2006), and also with the areas of supranational decision-making in the EU (see Joerges and Neyer 
1997; Neyer 2003; Schmalz-Bruns 1999, 2002; Eriksen 2006). 
7 Overall, studies observe the highest likelihood for deliberation in exclusive in-camera settings which 
are dominated by technocratic issues and experts, the EU comitology studies of Joerges and Neyer 
(1997) being a case in point (but see also Checkel 2001; Deitelhoff and Müller 2005; Ulbert and Risse 
2005; Nanz and Steffek 2004). These features obviously violate central democratic principles such as 
transparency, accountability or publicity. Under such a perspective, however, deliberative politics do 
not lead to any kind of democratization of politics beyond the state in general and of the EU in 
particular but only to a rationalization of politics or, as some claim, to an expertocracy (see Maus 
2002, 2007; Brunkhorst 2002, 2007; Schmalz-Bruns 1999). 
8 Since 1991, the deputies of the Parlamento Centroamericano (ParlCen) are elected directly in its 
member states El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic 
(see www.parlacen.org.gt/index.html). 
9 For an overview of the European Parliament see Jacobs et al. (2005), Judge/Earnshaw (2008). 
10 For an overview of the European Parliament in foreign, security and defence politics see Diedrichs 
(2004); Brok and Gresch (2004); Thym (2006). 
11 The Treaty of Lisbon brought about only minor changes to the European Parliament’s competences 
in security and defence policy. The former article 21 TEU did not explicitly mention defence policy as 
a subject of parliamentary control. Furthermore, the number of annual debates was doubled, from one 
to two. 
12 During its fifth parliamentary term (1999-2004), the Foreign Affairs Committee discussed 
developments in CFSP/ESDP with the EU’s High Representative Solana (who attended ten committee 
meetings), various foreign ministers of the member states, special EU representatives to specific 
regions or countries, members of the EU military staff and the Secretary General of NATO (see the 
committee’s activity report for the 5th legislature (1999-2004) (PE.341.376). 
13 European Parliament 2007, Report on the annual report from the Council to the European 
Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, including the financial implications for the 
general budget of the European Communities (point H, paragraph 40, of the Interinstitutional 
Agreement of 6 May 1999) - 2005 (PE.382.414). 
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14 Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure (1999/C 172/01) 
and Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (2006/C 139/01). The IIA of 2006 that 
entered into force in January 2007 replacing its predecessor formalizes the consultation procedure 
between Council and Parliament. Thus, the Council is obliged to transmit a forward-looking document 
by 15 June. Moreover, if Council decisions have financial implications, Parliament must be informed 
within five days. Finally, the IIA provides for a minimum of five consultation meetings between 
Council and Parliament.  
15 The revised version of the protocol on the role of national parliaments that is attached to the Lisbon 
Treaty for the first time mentions foreign, security and defence policy explicitly as a prime subject of 
cooperation between parliaments. For a detailed discussion of these forms of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation see Barbé and Herranz Surrallés (2008) and Hilger (2008). 
16 In addition to the 27 EU member states, five associated states (namely the NATO member states 
Albania, Croatia, Iceland, Norway and Turkey) and seven partner states (namely Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Russian Federation, Serbia, FYROM and Ukraine) send delegations to 
the Assembly and enjoy the right to speak and propose amendments in plenary sessions but no voting 
rights. The right of observers (currently Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the European Parliament, the 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly) to speak in the plenary is 
subject to the discretion of the President of the WEU-Assembly. For a detailed discussion of these 
assemblies see Marschall (2008) and Hilger (2008). 
17 The most notable proposal was submitted to the European Constitutional Convention that discussed 
the outline of a European Constitutional Treaty in 2002/2003. See „The role of national parliaments in 
the European Union and more specifically in the ESDP - a contribution from the Assembly to the 
Convention. Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr Eyskens, Rapporteur 
(A/1778)“, 4 June 2002. 
18 Only once, in 1967, the WEU Assembly has actually rejected a report (Marschall 2005, 224). 
